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GAMBLING CONTRACTS.-SALES ON MARGIN.

The

cases

in which

the question has been raised of the legality of sales of stocks or

commodities are capable of classification into two general groups :
(I) Where the parties contemplate delivery of the goods, whether
actual or symbolical, unconditional or with a condition as to time;
(2) where the parties contemplate no delivery, but reserve the
option to demand delivery, or where they contemplate no delivery
but only a settlement of the difference in price. The cases falling within the first group seem to determine that such sales are not
wagers, but bona fide contracts: Sawyer v. Taggert (Ky.), 14
Bush, 727 (1879); White v. Barber, 123 U. S. 392 (x887);

although at one time the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania seemed
inclined to take a contrary view regarding contracts for the sale of
stock for future delivery where the vendor has not the shares in his
possession:

Ruchizky v. De Haven, 97 Pa.

202 (i88i).

Turning to the second class of cases we find that even where no
delivery is contemplated, but one party reserves an option to
require delivery if he choose, the contract is not necessarily invalid.
That there is a hazard in such contracts is not denied, but it is well
settled that there is nothing inherently orj rima facie vicious about
It should be
them: Bigelow v. Benedict, 70 N. Y. 202 (1877).
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noticed, however, that recent statutory provisions in some jurisdictions render certain contracts of this kind illegal: Ill. Cr. Code,
§130. But where the intention of the parties is for a mere settlement of differences with no delivery of the things sold, the sale
amounts to nothing more than a wager and neither party can
enforce it: Grizewood v. Blane, ii C. B. 526 (1851); Benjamin on Sales, 6 Ed. 490.
This intention, however, must exist
in the minds of both parties:
Warren v. Scanlan, 59 Ill. App.
138 (1895) ; its existence is a question to be decided by the jury
in each case: Pope v. Hanke, 155 Ill. 617 (1894) ; Cover v.
Smith, 82 Md. 586 (1896); Biddle on Stock Brokers, 318; and
in determining its existence all the attending circumstances of the
may be taken into consideration, such as the brokers' mode of
doing business, the size of the transaction in relation to the financial resources of the parties and the amount of margin put up:
Gaw v. Bennett, 153 Pa. 247 (1893); Morris v. Norton, (U. S.
C. C. A. 6th C.), 75 Fed. Rep. 912 (1896).
How far the court will go in order to arrive at the real intention
of the parties may be seen by referring to a recent case in the
House of Lords: Universal Stock Exchange v. Strachan, L. R.
[1896] App. Cas. i66. The appellant brought from and sold to
the respondent various stocks and shares at the "take prices" of
the day. The bought and sold notes made out in each transaction.
stated that they acted "principal and broker" and subject to "the
terms" printed on the back. The "terms of business" were
signed by respondent, and contain, inter alia, the statement that
"every purchase or sale contracted by the company is a bona fide transaction for delivery on a specified settling day, and the company is
always prepared . . . to deliver or take up any stock it may
at any time have bought or sold, and the contracts entered into
. . . are not contracts of gaming or wagering."
Then followed
a provision for the postponement of the settling day, if mutually
agreed upon, and for the payment of interest to the company on
the amount of purchase moneys. In a suit by respondent to
recover securities handed to appellant the court decided that, in spite
of the plain statement in the written instrument that a delivery was
intended, the jury was justified in finding, from the whole nature
of the agreement, and from attendant circumstances, that no delivery was really contemplated. Lord Herschell, in the course of
his opinion, said (page 173): "It has been said that wherever
a contract is entered into between two parties containing an obligation under any circumstances to cause property to pass from one
to another, whatever else there may be in the contract, and although
neither party contemplate that that provision should ever become
operative, yet if it ever may become operative, the contract cannot
be by way of gaming and wagering. The proposition amounts to
this: that parties who intended to gamble with one another, but
wanted to have the security against one another of being able in a
court of justice to recover their bets, could compel a court of justice
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'to adjudicate and secure to them their bets by a judgment, if only
they inserted in their contract a provision, which might in certain
events become operative, to compel the goods to be delivered and
received, although neither of them anticipated such a contingency,
the purpose of inserting the provision creating an obligation being
only to cloak the fact that it was a gambling transaction, and enable
them to sue one another for gambling debts. . . . I should
require much consideration before I gave my assent to a proposition
involving such consequences."
The following United States cases
should be compared with the above: Porterv. Viets (U. S. C. C.,
N. D. Ill.), i Biss. 177 (1857) ; ex pare Young, 6 Biss. 53. In
the English decisions we do not have an instance of the contradictiction of a written contract by parol evidence, but rather a case
.of the interpretation of the terms of a transaction by reference to
the general intent of a written instrument forming a part thereof, and
to the attending circumstances, where the result is to contradict cer-tain clauses of the instrument.
VERBAL ADMISSION. -DECLARATIONS
AS TO PEDIGREE.
In Flora
-v. Anderson. 75 Fed. Rep. 217 (i896), the complainant sued to
recover a portion of the estate of one Nicholas Longworth. He
claimed as the illegitimate son of Eliza Longworth Flagg, daughter
of Nicholas Longworth, who had devised to Larz Anderson, his
son-in-law, and to Joseph Longworth, his son, the estate here in
dispute, in trust for the benefit of his daughter, Eliza Longworth
Flagg, during her life, with remainder to "the issue of her body
surviving her, and in default of such issue over to his son, Joseph
Longworth, and his grandson, John L. Stettirius."
Eliza L.
Flagg died in December, 189i, without issue of her marriage.
In order to maintain his claim it was necessary first for John W.
Flora, the complainant, to prove himself the illegitimate child of
Eliza L. Flagg. The testimony was voluminous, that of the complainant being founded almost altogether upon rumor and hearsay.
The story advanced was that some time between 1822 and 1826 the
complainant was born of Eliza Longworth, and when a few days
,old was delivered by agents of Nicholas Longworth to James Flora
.and his wife, of Kentucky, to raise; that Davis Carneal, husband
of an aunt of Eliza Longworth, was father of the child, and that
various visits were made by the Longworth family to Flora in Ken-tucky, when money and clothes were furnished to him.
Almost all this evidence was upon hearsay, from persons not belonging to or related to the Longworth family, the witnesses giving
.statements which they said were made to them or in their hearing
at times from thirty to fifty years before this bill was brought.
The defendants did not admit the competency of the evidence in
respect to the taking of the child to Kentucky, the placing of him
within the care of James W. Flora and wife, and showed discrepancies between various alleged statements brought forward by the
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complainant; they further showed the absolute untruth of many of'
these assertions.
The complainant depended greatly upon a verbal admission of
Carneal as to the pedigree of Flora and his transportation to Kentucky. The rule of evidence relative to verbal admissions was held
to be peculiarly applicable in this case. Sage, District Judge,
referred in this connection to § 200 of Greenleaf on Evidence, that
all verbal admissions ought to be received with great caution. "The
evidence, consisting as it does in the mere repetitions of oral statements, is subject to much imperfection and mistake, the party himself either being misinformed or not having clearly expressed his
Here
own meaning, or the witness having misunderstood him."
the only parties who claimed to have heard Carneal, the incriminated uncle, make any statement concerning the taking of the complainant, when but a few days old, to Kentucky, undertook to
detail statements made in his hearing when he was a boy of fourteen, more than seventy years before he gave his deposition.
With the exception of the alleged admission above referred to, the
evidence of the complainant as to his relationship to Eliza.Longworth
Flagg was hearsay, being declarations made by servants, friends,
and neighbors of the Longworth family. It was argued with force,
and with not a little plausibility, that declarations of those so closely
associated with a family as to be in fact almost a part of it should
be admissible. In considering the law, the court laid down in a
lengthy and learned opinion the following propositions as so well
established that they form part of the settled law:
i. The law resorts to hearsay evidence in cases of pedigree upon
the ground of the interest of the declarants in the persons from
whom the descent is made out, and their consequent interest in
knowing the connections of the family. The rule of admission is,
therefore, restricted to declarations of the deceased persons who
were related by blood or marriage to the person, and in that way
interested in the succession in question: Greenleaf on Evidence,
§ 103; Taylor on Evidence, § 579; Blachburn v. Crawfords, 3
Wall. x75 ; Fulkerson v. Holmes, x17 N. S. 389 ; Sitler v. Gehr,
105 Pa. 577.
This well-considered opinion adds authority to the rule permitting a resort to hearsay evidence of pedigree only in cases of declarations made by persons related by blood or marriage to the
person from whom succession is to be traced.
2. The rule that hearsay evidence is admissible in rases of pedigree is limited to cases of legitimate relationship. In such cases
the presumption is that declarations by deceased members of the
family are true, because ordinarily there is no motive for false statements, as there is likely to be in cases of illegitimacy : Crspin v.
Doglioni, 3 Swab. & Tr. 44. Where a relationship is acknowledged
as a matter of fact, and its lawfulness only is disputed, hearsay from
members of the family may be introduced to show that such relationship was lawful or was not lawful. But hearsay cannot be in-
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troduced to establish an unlawful relationship per se, where a lawful
relationship is not claimed. There are cases in which testimony as
to declarations of members of the family has been admitted to show
that the claimant was a bastard. But on examination it will appear that in those cases the testimony was introduced, not to show
bastardy per se, as a ground of claim, but to dispute a claim of
legitimacy: Vowles v. Young, 13 Ves. 147 ; Goodright v. Moss,
Cowp. 593 ; Aurray v. Mfine, 12 Ch. Div. 845 ; Jewel v. Jewel,
i How. 219; Haddock v. Railroad,3 Allen 298.

In Doev. Barton,

Moody & R. 28, the declarations of illegitimate relations were
rejected.
2

TwICE IN JEOPARDY-INSUFFICIENT INDICTMENT. Is an acquittal
on an insufficient indictment a bar to a subsequent prosecution for
the same offence?
The above question came up in the recent case of U. S. v. Ball,
163 U. S. 662 (1896).
M. F. Ball and his brother, J. C. Ball,
and Boutwell were tried for murder on an indictment not stating
the place of death. M. F. Ball was acquitted, and the others were
found guilty. They appealed on the ground of the insufficiency of
the indictment, and the indictment was quashed. A new indictment was then prepared against all three. M. F. Ball pleaded
autrefais acquit; the plea was overruled; he was found guilty and
appealed. It was held by the Supreme Court of the United States,
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Gray, that his acquittal was a bar to
a subsequent prosecution for the same offence, being on the merits
of the case, and not because of the insufficiency of the indictment,
as is shown by the fact that his co-defendants were found guilty on
that indictment.
It may be contended that this decision is contrary to the rule as
laid down in Vaux's Case, 4 Rep. 44 (I59I), and the cases following it in England and America, but an examination of these
cases seems to point to a clear distinction between them and the
case under discussion.
In Vaux's Case (supra) the defendant was charged with murder
by poison and the indictment stated that the murdered man "took
and drank," omitting "said poison." On a special verdict, the
judgment was quod eat sine die. He was tried again, and the plea,

autrefois acquit, was not allowed.

Lord Hale (2 Pleas of the

Crown, 394), thinks the judgment was delivered on the defect in
the indictment as much as on the verdict, and says that had the
judgment been on the verdict, quod eat inde quietus, the defendant
could not have been tried again.
This case has been supposed by some authorities to lead to the
doctrine that if the indictment is so ill that a judgment on it
would be reversible for error, it is too defective to be considered as
putting the defendant in jeopardy: Bishop's Grim. Law, s. 1021;

.3 Greenl Ev. s. 35.

In Commonwealth v. Purchase, 2 Pick.

525 (1824) Parker, C. J., says of this theory: "This

is because
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it is presumed the court will discover the defect in time to prevent:
judgment. This protection is bottomed on the assumed infallibilityof courts, which is not admitted in any other case."
According to the accepted rule, no man is considered twice in:
jeopardy until he is put on trial by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a sufficient indictment after an acquittal or conviction by
a jury. Therefore, where he is discharged on the first indictment
before verdict, he may be tried again. Also, where he has been
discharged upon his own motion, by verdict, or in arrest of judgment, or in error, on the special ground of the insufficiency of the
indictment and not on the merits of the case, he may be tried
anew, for, then, the indictment and trial on it are held invalid at
the special instance of the defendant, and the order for a new trial
places him in the position as though no trial had been had. This.
principle covers the decision in Vaux's Case (supra) and the cases
under it.
Also, where the defendant is acquitted or discharged on theground of insufficiency of indictment, not on his own motion, but
on that of the prosecution or by the court, it has been held he
may be indicted again: State v. Williams, 5 Md. 82 (1855).
These cases show that where the acquittal is directly caused by
the insufficiency of the indictment, it is no bar to a subsequent
prosecution; they do not apply to cases where the acquittal is on.
other grounds.
In People v. Barrett, i Johns. 66 (18o6), the defendant was tried
for conspiracy in defrauding Darren of his goods. The indictment
did not state the place of defrauding. During the trial a juror was
withdrawn. A verdict of guilty was found, and judgment arrested
by the court. The defendant was tried again, pleaded autrefois
acquit, and the plea was overruled by a divided court on the
ground that the indictment was erroneous. The majority of the
court held that the case fell under the rule of Vaux's Case (su1pra),
failing to note that the acquittal in the case under their consideration was not because of the insufficiency of the indictment, as that
was not discovered till after verdict. This distinction between
Peop5le v. Barretand Vaux's Case is pointed out by Livingston, J.,
in his dissenting opinion, which it is submitted is the correct onein that case. He shows the danger involved in the rule as declared
by the majority of the court, as it would give the district attorney
power to try ad infinitumn an acquitted man as often as some latent
defect can be discovered in the indictment. But even in this case
there was no acquittal on the merits. The defendant was found
guilty on the merits, and was afterwards discharged in arrest of
judgment because a juror had been withdrawn, and this fact may
have influenced the court on the second trial to extend the rule of'
Vaux's Case beyond what Lord Hale considered its true meaning.
Therefore, no previous case had decided the point in question in
U S. v. Ball; whether an acquittal on the merits, the indictment
being insufficient, was a bar to a subsequent prosecution.
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In allowing the plea of former acquittal in this case, Judge Gray
refers with approval to the dissenting opinion of Judge Livingston
in People v. Barrett (sipra), and says the principle of the common law is correctly stated in the Revised Statutes of Massachusetts
(1836): Public Stat. Mass. 1133. This provides that where a
man has been acquitted by a jury on the facts and merits, such
acquittal may be pleaded in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the
same offence, notwithstanding any defect in the indictment on
which he was acquitted; where he is acquitted on any exception to
the form or substance of the indictment he may be tried on a new
indictment, notwithstanding the former acquittal. A similar provision exists in Alabama.
Under the last clause of the Massachusetts statute fall Vaux's
Case (supra), and the multitude supporting it, and under the first
Ball v. U. S. (suipra), and in no better way can the distinction be
made clear than by reference to that statute.
The case of Rathbone v. Wirth,
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.
45 N. E. R. 15, (Oct. 27, 1896), is one of the latest attempts of"
the courts to determine what is included within the limits of that
The scope of the power
indefinite term " local self-government."
resident in each community to manage its own affairs is necessarily,
from its nature, somewhat variable, but it would seem that it might
be approximately arrived at. A great service will have been performed when it is authoritatively settled. In the meanwhile cases
like Pathbonev. W-irtlh are bound to arise whenever a state legislature endeavors to regulate the affairs of any particular locality.
The action in Rathbone v. Wirth was brought to obtain a injunction restraining the common council of Albany from electing
police commissioners in pursuance of the provisions of chapter"
427 of the Laws of 1896, passed to amend chapter 77 of the
Laws of 187o and other acts relating to the police department of
that city.
The amending act provided, inter alia, that the police board
should "consist of four police commissioners, not more than two•
of whom shall belong to the same political party," that "each
member of the common council shall be entitled to vote for not
more than two of such persons, and the four persons receiving the'
highest number of votes shall be such police commissioners," that
a vacancy "shall be filled by appointment by the mayor upon the
written recommendation of a majority of the members of the common council belonging to the same political party or organization
as the police commissioner whose office shall become vacant," and
that "no person is eligible to the office of police commissioner unless, at the time of his election, he is a member of the political
party or organization having the highest or the next highest representation in the common council."
The Supreme Court at special term and in the appellate division
upheld the plaintiffs in their demand for an injunction, and the'-
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defendants appealed. The judgment was affirmed, but three
judges dissented.
The view of the majority, holding the act unconstitutional, was
based on the ground that it offended against section 2, article io, of
the State Constitution, which provides that "all city, town and
village officers whose election or appointment is not provided for
by this constitution, shall . . . be appointed by such authorities thereof, as the legislature shall designate for that purpose."
The court considered that when the legislature had once acted
upon this constitutional provision and had determined upon the
local appointing power, that power ought not to be hampered or
impeded. This was thought by Gray, J., to be the chief objection
to the act. It threatened in his judgment the cardinal principle of
local self-government.
He says: " In the local or political subdivisions of the state the people of the locality shall administer
their own local affairs to the extent that that right is not restricted
by some constitutional provision."
The right to administer evidently includes the right to choose the local officers, either directly
by election or indirectly through appointment by the local
authorities.
Other grounds for holding the act unconstitutional were that it
destroyed majority rule; that it deprived citizens of rights otherwise than by the law of the land or the judgment of their peers;
that it provided an additional test of qualification for an office of
public trust; and that even if the obnoxious clauses were struck out,
the purpose for which the act was passed, namely, to obtain a nonpartisan board, would be defeated.
The dissenting judges agreed with the majority of the court in
considering that the clauses which limited eligibility for office to
members of the two leading political parties were unconstitutional,
but thought that they could be eliminated without affecting the act;
there would remain, however, the provision that not more than two
commissioners should belong to the same party, which would not
necessitate the appointment of holders of any particular political
belief, and which was similar to provisions that have been held
constitutional. They also held that the legislature could prescribe
the details of procedure provided it did not deprive the appointing
authority of the power to act in the premises, and they denied
that such was the effect of the act.
Looking at the act with regard to its advisability, it would seem
that, while the object was an excellent one in some ways, the
method employed was a distinct encroachment upon the rights of
the locality, and the result would probably have been a deadlock in
the board, it being divided as to every question upon political lines.
The experience of municipal governments seems to show that more
is accomplished by an active and responsible man than by a board
where political considerations have weight. The street cleaning of
New York furnishes an example. For these reasons, therefore, the
decision appears to be a wise one.

